Discovery Sanctions against the Criminal Defendant: Preclusion, Judicial Discretion and Truth-Seeking by Atkinson, Matthew R.
Pace Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 2 Summer 1994 Article 6
June 1994
Discovery Sanctions against the Criminal
Defendant: Preclusion, Judicial Discretion and
Truth-Seeking
Matthew R. Atkinson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew R. Atkinson, Discovery Sanctions against the Criminal Defendant: Preclusion, Judicial
Discretion and Truth-Seeking, 14 Pace L. Rev. 597 (1994)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss2/6
Comment
Discovery Sanctions Against the Criminal
Defendant: Preclusion, Judicial Discretion
and Truth-Seeking
I. Introduction
Discovery rules in criminal proceedings were introduced to
further truth-seeking. Promulgation of these rules has created
an enforcement problem for the courts. The severest sanction
for a discovery violation is the preclusion of the testimony which
the defense seeks to admit in violation of the rules.' However,
when the testimony is exculpatory, and possibly critical to the
defense, the harshness of the preclusion is apparent in the con-
text of the policy the discovery rules seeks to advance. 2 Enforce-
ment of truth-seeking rules by preclusion of exculpatory
testimony may also preclude truth finding and clash with con-
stitutional rights of the criminal defendant. On the other hand,
an inviolable right of the defense to introduce testimony weak-
ens the courts' ability to enforce compliance with discovery
rules and consequently undercuts the efficacy and aim of discov-
ery, truth-seeking.
Prior to Taylor v. Illinois,3 the courts wrestled with this
tension by selecting a sanction only after balancing the circum-
stances of the violation with the consequences of admitting the
1. Enforcement of these rules against the defense is alternately effected by
empowering the court to impose disciplinary sanctions on the defense attorney,
granting a continuance or a mistrial, or fashioning a remedy as justice requires.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 16(d)(2); MAss. R. CRIM. P. 14(c)(2); ILL. S. CT. RULE
415(g); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 250.2.
2. See generally infra part I.
3. 484 U.S. 400, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 983 (1988).
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proffered testimony and its probative value.4 The principal fac-
tor considered was the importance of the proffered testimony to
the defendant.5 Because preclusion was considered constitu-
tionally suspect under the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment,6 motions to preclude were closely scruti-
nized and rarely granted.7
In Taylor v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court re-
solved the uncertainty over the constitutionality of preclusion8
by holding that preclusion was constitutional, at least where
discovery violations were the result of egregious misconduct
sufficient to raise a presumption that the proffered testimony
was perjured. 9 Nonetheless, Taylor intentionally left the pre-
cise contours of constitutional preclusion undefined. 10 Courts
purportedly following Taylor have emphasized the bad faith of
the defense," delay tactics, 12 and prejudice to judicial process' 3
to justify preclusion.' 4 Taylor, by holding that preclusion is a
constitutional sanction with undefined, and therefore elastic
contours, has encouraged appellate court deference to trial
court determinations that preclusion is warranted. 5
This article suggests that the narrowed constitutional
rights of the criminal defendant under Taylor, and the resulting
4. Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1984), enunciated the
leading balancing test. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
5. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
6. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to compel attendance of witnesses is empty
if the defense has no right to present them. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409. The Supreme
Court has held that this right applies to state as well as federal criminal prosecu-
tions. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
9. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416-17. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
In Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991), the Court suggested that Taylor author-
ized preclusion without the inference that proffered testimony is perjurious. Id. at
153. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
14. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Escalera v.
Coombe, 826 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 571 A.2d
1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
15. But see State v. Ben, 798 P.2d 650 (Or. 1990) (ignoring the Taylor analy-
sis); see infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
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expansion of trial judge discretion, should be reconsidered. The
premises upon which Taylor were built are faulty, and the legit-
imate goals of truth-seeking could be better accomplished by al-
ternate means.
Part II of this Comment outlines the history and policies of
present discovery rules. Part III examines the appellate stan-
dard of review for trial court preclusion and reviews the Taylor
decision, as well as pre-Taylor and post-Taylor cases that have
considered the use of preclusion as a discovery sanction. Part
IV analyzes the inconsistency of the courts' treatment of preclu-
sion as a sanction for discovery violations. Part V concludes
that the present vague standard for preclusion is inconsistent
with the truth-seeking values it purports to advance.
II. The History and Policy of Discovery Rules
Discovery of the defense began with the adoption of notice-
of-alibi statutes by various states in the 1920s. 16 The stated
policy of the statutes was to prevent tactical surprise, perjured
testimony, and mid-trial delays occasioned by the prosecution's
request for a continuance to investigate the proffered alibi de-
fense. 17 Discovery rules have evolved considerably since the
first notice-of-alibi statutes.
The California Supreme Court fashioned reciprocal discov-
ery rules without legislative mandate in Jones v. Superior
Court.'8 Jones, written by Chief Justice Traynor, held that the
prosecution could discover expert testimony that the defense in-
tended to introduce at trial. 19 By arguing that the disclosure of
the testimony was only accelerated and not compelled, the court
reasoned that discovery did not violate the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination.20 As the policy behind
16. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial
Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1574 & n.16 (1986).
17. Id. at 1574-75.
18. 372 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1962). The California Supreme Court required the de-
fendant to disclose witnesses he intended to call to testify to establish his affirma-
tive defense. Id. at 922.
19. Id. at 922.
20. Id. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1994] 599
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discovery was truth-seeking, the court reasoned that it should
be a two-way street.21
The truth-seeking function of reciprocal discovery was sub-
sequently advocated by Supreme Court Justice William J. Bren-
nan.22 Justice Brennan argued that a defendant would, and
should, benefit from liberal discovery rules, albeit with ade-
quate safeguards. 23 He recognized that the prosecution had a
clear advantage over the defense because of the relatively vast
resources of the district attorney's office compared to those of
the typically indigent defendant represented by court-appointed
counsel. 24 Justice Brennan believed that liberal discovery
would even the playing field.25
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the con-
stitutionality of the discovery of a criminal defendant in Wil-
liams v. Florida.26 The Court held that Florida's notice-of-alibi
discovery rule did not violate the Fifth Amendment right
21. Jones, 372 P.2d at 922. California's experiment with judicial discovery
rule-making finally proved unworkable. First, unwilling to assist the prosecution's
case-in-chief, the California Supreme Court refused to permit discovery of all de-
fense witnesses' names, addresses, and the substance of intended testimony.
Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1970). Second, the court
refused to develop an alibi notice rule, arguing that the court's proper role is to
protect constitutional rights and not to devise merely socially desirable rules which
test constitutional limits. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d 45, 52-53 (Cal.
1974). Following the logic in Reynolds, the court finally held that all reciprocal
discovery rule-making relating to testimony should be left to the legislature. Peo-
ple v. Collie, 634 P.2d 534, 541 (Cal. 1981). The legislature responded by enacting
discovery rules in 1990. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054 (West Supp. 1994). The constitu-
tionality of the Act was subsequently affirmed by the California Supreme Court in
Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 309 (Cal. 1991).
22. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 291.
23. Id. at 294-95.
24. Id. at 285-87; see also NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES
FOR THE POOR 3 n.4 (1982) (of seven million felony and non-traffic misdemeanor
arrests in 1971, approximately 3.4 million required appointed counsel); REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (1963) (approximately 60-70% of all felony defend-
ants are classed as indigent).
25. Brennan, supra note 22, at 291-95. Brennan's concern for the rights of the
criminal defendant was in marked contrast to Judge Learned Hand's earlier con-
tention in United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) that the defense
has unwarranted protections because of the illusion that an innocent party may be
convicted. The Garsson court held that the defense may not inspect grand jury
minutes for evidence of prejudice. Id. at 649.
26. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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against self-incrimination.27 The Court employed the same ar-
gument advanced by Justice Traynor in Jones, that the re-
quired acceleration of disclosure under the rule did not "compel"
disclosure as would be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.28
This decision provided the constitutional basis for the subse-
quent proliferation of discovery statutes which required, in the
extreme, full disclosure of any defense and supporting evidence
the defendant intended to introduce at trial.29 Despite Justice
Brennan's advocacy of discovery for the benefit of the defense in
1963,30 discovery since Williams has arguably eroded the crimi-
nal defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment interests. 31
In Williams, the discovery rule was reciprocal but the Court
did not decide the question of whether reciprocity was constitu-
tionally required.32 The Court subsequently answered this
question in Wardius v. Oregon,33 and held that notice-of-alibi
statutes must provide for reciprocal discovery.3 4 In its analysis,
the Court underscored the policy considerations in favor of lib-
eral discovery: "discovery devices [are] a salutary development
which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, en-
hance[ ] the fairness of the adversary system."35 The Court rea-
soned that "in the absence of a strong showing of state interests
to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State
may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as
defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker
game' secrecy for its own witnesses."36
27. Id. at 83; "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
29. Mosteller, supra note 16, at 1579-84.
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 16, at 1585-92.
32. Williams, 399 U.S. at 82-83 & n.11.
33. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
34. Id. at 472.
35. Id. at 474.
36. Id. at 475.
1994] 601
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III. Enforcement of Discovery Rules Against the Defense
A. Standard of Review
Williams laid the constitutional foundation for the states to
enact truth-seeking discovery rules for criminal proceedings. 37
Ultimately, the sanction of preclusion to enforce the discovery
rules came into conflict with the constitutional interest in
presenting exculpatory testimony formulated in the Supreme
Court decision, Washington v. Texas.38 It is the scope of this
constitutional interest which determines the standard of appel-
late review for preclusion of exculpatory testimony as a sanction
for violating discovery rules.
In Washington, the Court held that the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment was incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 39 and therefore
applied to the states. 40 In Washington, the Court reviewed a
Texas statute which disqualified an alleged accomplice from
testifying on a defendant's behalf on the premise that such tes-
timony was perjured. 41 After holding that a defendant had the
constitutional right to present exculpatory testimony, the Court
found that the Texas statute violated this right: "the Constitu-
tion is ... violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole catego-
ries of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori
categories that presume them unworthy of belief."42
The Court in Williams specifically did not rule on whether
the sanction of preclusion for violation of a discovery rule would
violate the Sixth Amendment right to Compulsory Process.43
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions also reserved this ques-
tion.44 The relation between the constitutional right of the de-
37. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
38. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
39. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Washington, 388 U.S. at 17-19.
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Id. at 22. The Court also noted that the Texas statute permitted the pros-
ecution's use of accomplice testimony on the irrational presumption that an accom-
plice would lie to protect a defendant but be truthful to assist the prosecution. Id.
43. Williams, 399 U.S. at 83 n.14.
44. E.g., Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060, 1061 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948, 949 (1983); Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1972).
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fense to present exculpatory testimony and the preclusion
sanction was not addressed by the Supreme Court until Taylor
v. Illinois.45 Until Taylor, therefore, a defendant's interest in
presenting probative testimony, made constitutional under
Washington, generally outweighed a government's interest in
enforcing the preclusion sanction.46 In such circumstances, ap-
pellate courts were very likely to reverse a conviction where a
trial court committed constitutional error by precluding excul-
patory testimony.47 Reversal is likely because the standard of
review for constitutional error is far more rigorous than for non-
constitutional error. 48
A judge may make numerous decisions during a trial con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence and procedural matters.
An appellate court normally reviews these decisions on the def-
erential standard of whether the trial judge abused her discre-
tion.49 Where the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
are implicated, however, the trial judge's decisions may be sub-
jected to heightened scrutiny and the appellate court may re-
view the factual basis for the preclusion in addition to the trial
court's application of the law.50 When an appellate court finds
non-constitutional error, the appellate court may not reverse
the trial court's judgment unless the error affects the "substan-
tial rights of the parties."51 When constitutional error is found,
the appellate court on direct review inquires whether the pre-
clusion is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.52 The burden of
45. 484 U.S. 400 (1987). In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the
Supreme Court approved of the trial court's placing a condition on the admission of
defense testimony and precluding that testimony when the defense refused to com-
ply with the condition. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Escalera v. Coombe, 826 F.2d 185, 189-94 (2d Cir. 1987).
48. LISSA GRIFIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS § 5.2(4) (June 1993).
49. Id. §§ 5.4, 5.4(1).
50. Id. § 5.2(4).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(A); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1258 (West 1982 & Supp 1994). The judicial test for this standard as articulated
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) is whether "the error had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."
52. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Supreme Court has
recently held that the Chapman "harmless error" rule does not apply to collateral,
or habeas corpus, review. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1713-14 (1993).
The Court in Brecht instead decided that the standard for habeas relief is whether
the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
1994] 603
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proving error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is nearly in-
surmountable. On the other hand, if no constitutional right is
at stake, the trial judge has considerable latitude in determin-
ing whether to admit otherwise probative testimony.53 The ten-
sion between the preclusion sanction, a non-constitutional
procedural rule, and the constitutional right of the defense to
present witnesses in its favor, therefore turns on the extent to
which that constitutional right is qualified and possible error is
scrutinized.
B. Cases before Taylor v. Illinois
In United States v. Nobles,54 a federal prosecution for
armed bank robbery, the United States Supreme Court held
that preclusion of a defense investigator's testimony as a sanc-
tion under the federal discovery rule55 was constitutional. 56
There, the defense had refused to provide the prosecution with
the investigator's report for purposes of cross-examination.57
The trial court only required disclosure of those portions of the
report pertinent to the proferred testimony.58 The Court stated:
"[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present tes-
timony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial sys-
tem; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification
for presenting what might have been a half-truth."59 The Court
did not bar the proffered testimony for the violation of a discov-
ery rule, but rather conditioned the admissibility of the profer-
red testimony because truth-seeking would be enhanced by "full
disclosure of all the [relevant] facts."60
On the other hand, in another federal prosecution for
armed bank robbery, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). This new limitation on
habeas relief does not affect the analysis of whether constitutional error occured
nor whether relief is available on direct appeal. See id. at 1721. Brecht, however,
does render the analysis moot in collateral review when prejudice does not rise to
the Kotteakos standard. See id. at 1722.
53. See, e.g., infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
54. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
56. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241.
57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 240.
59. Id. at 241.
60. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700, 709 (1974)).
604 [Vol. 14:597
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in United States v. Barron6' affirmed the district court's preclu-
sion of an alibi defense with only passing reference to truth-
seeking values. 62 The defense had answered the prosecution's
notice-of-alibi discovery request one day late and one day before
the trial began.6 3 Even with a timely notice of an alibi defense,
the prosecution would have had only one day to prepare a rebut-
tal before trial. 64 Nonetheless, the appellate court held that
since the "parties agree[d] [that] abuse of discretion [was] the
proper standard of review,"65 no Sixth Amendment issue was
raised on appeal,6 6 and because notice was late, preclusion of
the alibi defense was justified.67 The court reasoned that since
the defendant was responsible for the delay,68 even though the
non-compliance could be attributed to ignorance of the rule, 69 it
was still reasonable to sanction the defendant for failure to com-
ply.70 The Ninth Circuit also held that the preclusion was ap-
propriate, in part, because the district court did not finally rule
on preclusion until after the prosecution had made a very
strong case.71 The Ninth Circuit inferred that the strength of
the prosecution's case, combined with the violation of the rule,
suggested that the proffered alibi testimony was perjured.72
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of the preclusion sanction for the violation of a
discovery rule in United States v. Davis.7 3 In this federal prose-
cution for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, the
defense failed to disclose, pursuant to a discovery request, the
names of two witnesses the defense sought to call to impeach
61. 575 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id. at 755-56.
64. Id. at 756-57.
65. Id. at 757.
66. Id. at 757 n.5.
67. Id. at 757.
68. Id. at 756. Barron did not trust his government-paid public defender, who
moved to substitute private counsel just before the jury was impaneled on the
grounds that Barron would not confide in him. The court denied the motion. Id. at
755.
69. Id. at 757-58.
70. Id. at 758.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1981).
1994] 605
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the credibility of the government's key witness.74 The district
court precluded the testimony because of the defense's failure to
comply with the discovery rule and on the grounds that the
proffered testimony was "merely cumulative and impeaching."7 5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held "that the [C]ompulsory
[P]rocess [C]lause of the [S]ixth [A]mendment forbids the exclu-
sion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to en-
force discovery rules or orders against criminal defendants."7 6
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that unlike other evidentiary orders,
such as sequestration, 77 "discovery orders are designed to pre-
vent surprise, not to protect the integrity of the evidence sought
to be presented."78 The Fifth Circuit further held that the testi-
mony was crucial to the defense and that the preclusion was,
therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.79
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Fendler v.
Goldsmith,80 considered, but did not find it necessary to adopt,
the holding in Davis.8' The Ninth Circuit construed Davis to
hold that the preclusion sanction was unconstitutional per se.8 2
In Fendler, the court reviewed a prisoner's petition for habeas
corpus from a state conviction for falsifying bank records. 83 The
petitioner argued that the preclusion of defense witnesses who
would testify that his bank reports were accurate, in at least
some respects, violated his Sixth Amendment right to compul-
sory process.8 4 After the defense had repeatedly failed to com-
ply with the reciprocal discovery provisions of the Arizona
74. Id. at 241-42.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
77. Sequestration is the practice whereby succeeding witnesses are prevented
from hearing the testimony of former witnesses to prevent the subsequent testi-
mony from conforming to prior testimony, whether by perjury or unconsciously.
The practice preserves the integrity of the testimony and is recorded as early as
the apocryphal story of Susanna and the Elders. THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE WITH
APOCRYPHA 180 (Oxford 1976). See also Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91
(1893) (holding that the testimony of a witness who violated a sequestration order
may be excluded under certain circumstances).
78. Davis, 639 F.2d at 243.
79. Id. at 245.
80. 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 1188.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1182-83.
84. Id.
606 [Vol. 14:597
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Rules, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to pre-
clude testimony from those witnesses for whom the defense had
not provided addresses.8 5
After summarizing the merits of the Davis holding,8 6 the
Ninth Circuit discussed the balancing test employed by some
state courts to determine whether the sanction was necessary.8 7
The court described a four part balancing test as follows: 1) the
effectiveness of less severe sanctions; 2) the probable impact of
the precluded evidence on the outcome; 3) the degree of preju-
dice or surprise to the prosecution had the evidence been admit-
ted; 4) the willfulness or bad faith on the part of the defense88
The court found doctrinal support for the balancing test,
weighted in favor of admitting probative evidence, in an earlier
Supreme Court case, Chambers v. Mississippi 9:
the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to call and examine witnesses is
"not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process .... But
its denial or significant diminution calls into question the ulti-
mate integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the
competing interest be closely examined."90
The Fendler court found that it did not have to choose be-
tween the balancing test or the Davis rule as the preclusion
sanction against Fendler failed constitutional scrutiny under
either test.91 The court applied the balancing test to the facts of
the case as follows: 1) a brief continuance would have been ade-
quate; 2) the proffered testimony only needed to be "helpful" to
the defense; 3) there was no unfair surprise to the prosecution;
4) although the violation was willful, little weight should be
given to this factor.92 The court allocated little weight to the
willfulness of the violation because it found that "[t]he determi-
85. Id. at 1183. The defense first partially complied with the discovery order
by providing the names for over 1,000 witnesses, but failed to provide the ad-
dresses of some witnesses, including those precluded, even after the defense had
amended its discovery response. Id.
86. Id. at 1185-87.
87. Id. at 1187.
88. Id.
89. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
90. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1187 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973)).
91. Id. at 1188.
92. Id. at 1188-90.
1994] 607
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native factor here is that Fendler was deprived of the testimony
of a witness who was important to his defense on a material
issue." 93 The court nonetheless remanded to the district court
to determine whether the preclusion was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."94 The court specifically rejected the abuse of
discretion standard utilized in Barron95 where no constitutional
issue was raised.96 Instead, the court held that the heightened
scrutiny of a presumption against preclusion was appropriate.97
The Fendler type balancing test was thereafter generally
adopted by the courts and preferred to the per se rule of Davis.98
C. Taylor v. Illinois 99
Taylor was the first United States Supreme Court case to
deal directly with the constitutionality of preclusion. 100 The
Court held that preclusion for not complying with a general dis-
covery request is not always a violation of compulsory process
under the Sixth Amendment and found no constitutional error
on the facts of the case. 10
93. Id. at 1190.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
96. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1187.
97. Id. at 1188.
98. See, e.g., Eckert v. Tansy, 936 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1991); Escalera v.
Coombe, 826 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 1054 (1988);
United States ex rel. Enoch v. Hartigan, 768 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd,
808 F.2d 1515 (3d Cir.), vacated, 822 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1987); United States ex rel.
Robinson v. McGinnis, 593 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1078 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); State v. Delgado, 848 P.2d 337 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993); People v. Edwards, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Pronovost, 756 P.2d 387 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); McCarty v. New Mexico, 763 P.2d
360 (N.M. 1988); City of Lakewood v. Papadelis, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio 1987); cf
People v. Hayes, 364 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Mich. 1984) (holding Fendler balancing not
appropriate where preclusion sanction employed under state law was necessary to
preserve integrity of the evidence in situation similar to sequestration).
99. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
100. The Court in Nobles did not affirm absolute preclusion of the testimony,
but rather the conditional admissibility of the testimony. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text. See also Escalera, 826 F.2d at 189 (citing United States
Supreme Court decisions declining to address the constitutionality of uncondi-
tional preclusion); Braunskill, 629 F. Supp. at 521 (citing United States Supreme
Court decisions reserving the question whether exclusion of testimony violates the
defendant's right to Compulsory Process).
101. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409, 416-18.
608
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The defendant, Taylor, was convicted in Illinois of at-
tempted murder for shooting the victim during a street fight. 0 2
At trial, the defense offered testimony that the victim's brother
shot the victim by accident. 10 3 On the second day of trial, the
defense counsel moved to amend his "Answer to Discovery" by
including two more witnesses, one of whom never appeared. °4
Defense counsel explained his late request by asserting that he
had just learned of the witnesses. 0 5 At the voir dire of the
proferred witness, Wormley, it came to light that defense coun-
sel had lied regarding when he had first learned of the wit-
ness.10 6 The trial judge excluded the testimony because the
discovery violation was blatant, discovery violations were a
problem in prior cases before his court, 07 and because both fac-
tors led to an inference that the proffered testimony was sus-
pect. 08 The substance of the witness' testimony was that the
victim, and his brother, had guns and were "after" the defend-
ant and others. 0 9
The United States Supreme Court held that the preclusion
was constitutional because the defendant was liable for his at-
torney's misconduct;" 0 the misconduct was willful and blatant,
permitting a "sufficiently strong inference" that the testimony
was fabricated;"' and because the defense was seeking a tacti-
cal advantage. 112 Although the Court referred to the Fendler
balancing test in a footnote," 3 the Court deemed the admission
of the testimony and the imposition of alternate sanctions inad-
equate where the misconduct justified a presumption that the
defense was seeking to introduce perjured testimony. 1 4 The
102. Id. at 402.
103. Id. at 402-03.
104. Id. at 403-04.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 404-05.
107. Id. at 405. The trial court did not disclose whether the prior cases had
any relation to the instant case. Id. See also infra notes 272-73 and accompanying
text.
108. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 405.
109. Id. at 404.
110. Id. at 417-18.
111. Id. at 417.
112. Id. at 415.
113. Id. at 415 n.19.
114. Id. at 417. The Court's apparent reliance on the inference of perjury to
justify preclusion does not necessarily mean that such an inference is required. In
1994] 609
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Court found the trial judge's concern for discovery violations in
prior trials relevant if the defense attorney had been guilty of
those violations, or if the violations in other trials were some-
how relevant to the credibility of the proffered evidence in the
present case. 115
D. The Effect of Taylor v. Illinois
1. Federal Courts
The history of Escalera v. Coombe" 6 illustrates the effect of
Taylor. In Escalera, the defendant was convicted of felony mur-
der and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds,
inter alia, that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to
compulsory process when an alibi witness was precluded as a
sanction for the defense's violation of the New York notice-of-
alibi statute." 7 The district court held that the surprise and
potential prejudice to the prosecution, the lack of good excuse
for the delay in offering the alibi defense, and the inadequacy of
alternate sanctions outweighed the defendant's interest in his
brother's alibi testimony which the court presumed the jury
would be "likely to discount.""18 The district court, therefore,
denied the petition."19
The Second Circuit reversed' 20 after weighing again the in-
terests at stake and finding that the proffered testimony was
crucial to the defendant.' 21 The court also noted that there was
no showing of bad faith on the part of the defendant.' 22 The
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991), the Court characterized Taylor as holding
that preclusion was permissible when the defense's violation was willful and calcu-
lated to gain a tactical advantage. Id. at 153. The omission of any reference to the
inference of perjury in Lucas suggests that such an inference is unnecessary. See
infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text for an analysis of the application of Tay-
lor without finding an inference of perjury.
115. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416 n.22. The Court does not explain the relevance of
prior violations. For further discussion see infra notes 273-74 and accompanying
text.
116. 826 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 652 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1987),
vacated by 484 U.S. 1054 (1988), modified by 852 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
117. Escalera, 826 F.2d at 188.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 188-89.
120. Id. at 194.
121. Id. at 191-92.
122. Id. at 191.
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defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process should,
therefore, take precedence over the sanction of preclusion. 123
Subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided Taylor, as well as granting the prosecu-
tion's petition for certiorari and vacating Escalera for reconsid-
eration in light of Taylor.124
On remand, the Second Circuit determined that it was un-
able to apply Taylor on the record, as it was unable to deter-
mine whether the trial court's finding of an "absence of a good
excuse" for the discovery violation was equivalent to willful mis-
conduct "motivated by a desire to gain a tactical advantage." 125
The Second Circuit, therefore, remanded to the district court for
an evidentiary hearing. 126 The court also stated, without citing
any authority, that the Supreme Court's holding that a defense
attorney's conduct could be imputed to the defendant did not
include error produced by the attorney's "mere inadvertence or
even gross negligence."127
The Second Circuit's concerns in Escalera were not appar-
ent in United States v. Cervone, 28 where the Second Circuit
heard the appeals of six defendants variously convicted for
RICO 129 conspiracy, obstruction of justice, labor bribery, extor-
tion, and perjury. 30 One defendant, Bernesser, argued that the
preclusion of medical testimony was an unconstitutional in-
fringement on his Sixth Amendment right to present a de-
fense. 131 The testimony, tending to show his loss of short term
memory, 32 was proffered after a six month delay in violation of
the discovery rule. 13 Citing Taylor for the proposition that pro-
cedural rules validly limit the constitutional right, the Second
123. Id.
124. Coombe v. Escalera, 484 U.S. 1054 (1988).
125. Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 907 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1990).
129. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68 (1988).
130. Cervone, 907 F.2d at 335-36.
131. Id. at 346.
132. Id. at 340. The testimony was proffered to show that the defendant had
not intentionally committed perjury. The testimony was unrelated to his convic-
tion for obstruction of justice. Id.
133. Id. at 346.
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Circuit concluded that Bernesser's "failure to assure [the] ad-
missibility [of the evidence] by timely notice is inconsistent with
the crucial significance he now ascribes to it."134
The petitioner in Chappee v. Vose 135 was similarly defeated
by Taylor. The defendant in Chappee was convicted for traffick-
ing in cocaine under Massachusetts law. 136 After the prosecu-
tion rested, the defense attorney sought permission to call three
expert witnesses to impeach the state's testing of the allegedly
controlled substance. 137 Because the defense had failed to dis-
close these witnesses, the Superior Court of Massachusetts pre-
cluded the testimony finding it was proffered in bad faith to
surprise the prosecution. 3
On review of the petition for habeas corpus, the district
court applied a modified Fendler balancing test. 39 The district
court found that the defense counsel acted in bad faith and that
the prejudice to the prosecution was severe. 40 Nonetheless, it
held that the lack of evidence showing defendant's complicity in
the attorney's misconduct tipped the scales in favor of the de-
fendant's right to present the testimony and, therefore, granted
the writ of habeas corpus.' 4 '
The First Circuit noted that the district court had heard
the petition prior to the Taylor Court's decision that it was con-
stitutionally permissible to punish the defendant for his attor-
ney's misconduct. 42 In addition, the court decided that Taylor
called for a balancing of the defendant's interest in compulsory
process against "countervailing public interests."1 43 These in-
terests consisted of the "integrity of the adversary process...
134. Id.
135. 843 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1988), rev'g 659 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1987).
136. Chappee, 843 F.2d at 26.
137. Id. at 27. The First Circuit termed the testimony an "isomer defense."
The purpose of the testimony was to show that the state's testing methodology was
inconclusive because the test would be positive for illegal cocaine as well as for
legal isomers. The court found the defense "widely rejected," although still admis-
sible in Massachusetts. Id. at 33 n.6.
138. Id. at 33-34.
139. Id. at 28-29. The district court applied the four part Fendler test, see
supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text, plus a fifth factor, the defendant's com-
plicity in the violation. Chappee, 843 F.2d at 28-29.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 29.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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the fair and efficient administration of justice ... [and] the po-
tential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial
process."144 The First Circuit also construed Taylor to hold that,
in order to protect the integrity of the adversary process, preclu-
sion was desirable when, as in the instant case, the discovery
violation was especially egregious. 145 The court held that, pur-
suant to Taylor, preclusion was the appropriate sanction and so
quashed the writ.1 46
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United
States v. Johnson 47 considered whether preclusion of alibi wit-
nesses was a permissible sanction in the conviction of the de-
fendant, Johnson, for wire fraud.148 The defendant's first trial
ended in a hung jury after he had defended with a partial al-
ibi.' 49 Approximately one week before the retrial, the prosecu-
tion received late notice of two additional alibi witnesses, the
defendant's brother and a friend. In addition to being late, the
notice was incomplete pursuant to the discovery rule.150 "[T]he
trial court ordered the proposed witnesses' testimony excluded.
The judge noted that Johnson's attorney had acted in good
faith, but addressed neither the defendant's possible lack of
good faith nor any other factors that may have guided his
choice."' 5'
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected bad faith as an
absolute condition for preclusion.' 52 The court also rejected a
"least restrictive analysis" of alternate sanctions, noting that
Taylor held that the preclusion sanction may be appropriate to
protect the judicial process even if alternate sanctions would
144. Id. (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15 & n.19). The cited footnote 19 in
Taylor recites the Fendler balancing test.
145. Id. The violation was egregious because the defense could have complied
with the non-onerous discovery rule, but decided to violate the rule as a "cutthroat"
tactic. Id. at 30-32.
146. Id. at 34.
147. 970 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 908.
149. Id. at 909.
150. Id. at 909-10. The notice did not specify as to what times and places the
proffered testimony was relevant, thereby limiting the prosecution's opportunity to
prepare a rebuttal. Id.
151. Id. at 910.
152. Id. at 911 (citing Cervone, 907 F.2d at 346). Cervone did not discuss bad
faith at all, however, Cervone is a doubtful authority for the proposition that bad
faith is not a requirement for preclusion. See infra note 254.
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cure prejudice to the prosecution.'5 3 The court finally adopted a
Taylor balancing test in which bad faith was an "important fac-
tor."154 Applying the test, the court considered the five month
delay in providing notice of the alibi suspicious, especially since
the witnesses were a friend and a brother of the defendant.
55
The court reasoned that the insufficient explanation for the de-
lay and the burden to the government in holding over the prose-
cution's witnesses 56 and the jury, would normally be sufficient
grounds to affirm the preclusion.' 57 The court's emphasis on the
delay and status of the alibi witnesses suggests that the court
either suspected that perjury was possible, or that the jury
would not find the witnesses credible. 58 Because bad faith was
an "important factor," however, the court remanded to the dis-
trict court for the explicit application of Taylor on the grounds
that the district court's only factual finding was the defense at-
torney's "good faith."15 9 It can be inferred that the District of
Columbia Circuit would affirm preclusion if, on remand, the dis-
trict court found bad faith on the part of the defendant.
Finally, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the con-
stitutional error, if any, was not harmless.' 60 It emphasized
that credible alibi evidence could jeopardize the effectiveness of
the prosecution's eye-witnesses.' 6 ' The court then noted that
Taylor balancing also tested the credibility of the evidence,
which it deemed an "overlapping" function. 62
153. Johnson, 970 F.2d at 911.
154. Id. at 911. The court, citing Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1988),
decided that Taylor established a balancing test in which bad faith was an impor-
tant factor. Id. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text for a description of
the Taylor test described in Chappee.
155. 970 F.2d at 912.
156. The witnesses were called from 'all over" the United States. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Contra Poo v. Hood, No. 89 CIV.7874, 1992 WL 30617 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
12, 1992), aff'd, 970 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that even if the preclusion of
alibi testimony was constitutional error, the error was harmless because the jury
would be unlikely to believe the testimony).
162. Johnson, 970 F.2d at 912. The court did not elucidate what it meant by
an "overlapping" function. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. The district
court was annoyed by the remand: "The [clourt feels obliged to note that the appel-
late opinion evidences a troubling lack of deference for this [c]ourt's implicit as-
sessment of the facts." United States v. Johnson, 815 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D.D.C.
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2. State Courts
State courts have had a mixed response to Taylor. In Com-
monwealth v. Zimmerman163 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania upheld the trial court's preclusion of an alibi defense
as a sanction for "deliberately fail[ing] to comply with the
mandatory provisions [of the discovery rule] in an attempt to
delay an already lengthy litigation."'6 The court held that this
finding, supported by the record, 165 met the "willful" test in Tay-
lor as expounded by Escalera.66
In contrast to Zimmerman, in State v. Ben 67 the Supreme
Court of Oregon reversed the trial court for precluding exculpa-
tory testimony in a prosecution for driving under the influence
of intoxicants, reckless endangerment, and criminal mischief.168
The defense had failed to disclose the names of two witnesses
until the morning of the trial.' 69 One witness was going to tes-
tify that he, and not the defendant, was driving the car.'70 The
other witness offered corroborating testimony.' 7' During the
court's lunch recess, the witnesses refused to talk to the prose-
cutor outside the presence of the defense attorney who was not
immediately available. 1'7 2 After the state had rested, the prose-
cutor objected to the proffered testimony on the grounds that
the defense had violated discovery by the late proffer of testi-
mony and by instructing the witnesses not to speak to the pros-
1993) (emphasis added). The district court, nonetheless, made specific findings to
justify preclusion, holding that the alibi testimony was perjurious and the late
proffer was designed to "prevent the Government from challenging the alibi testi-
mony effectively at trial." Id. The district court also found that a continuance to
provide the government with time to prepare a rebuttal was "not feasible given the
Court's trial schedule." Id. Thus the district court ticked off several elements of
Taylor: deference to the trial court, a probability of perjury and impermissible trial
tactics. Id.
163. 571 A.2d 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 953 (Pa.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1498 (1992).
164. Zimmerman, 571 A.2d at 1068 (quoting from the trial court opinion).
165. Id. (citing trial record enumerating the specific delays to the trial).
166. Id.
167. 798 P.2d 650 (Or. 1990).
168. Id. at 651.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 652.
172. Id.
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ecutor.173 The trial judge specifically found that the defense
was employing a strategy to "circumvent" the truth.174
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon agreed that the
defense had violated the discovery statute. 75 Nonetheless, the
court found that prejudice, if any, could have "conceivably" been
obviated by a recess or postponement, that the proffered testi-
mony was crucial to the defense, and that preclusion denied the
defendant a "fair trial." 76 The court, however, did not charac-
terize the preclusion as unconstitutional, nor did it specify its
standard of review. 77 The court only referred to Taylor in pass-
ing, holding that the defendant could be liable for his attorney's
actions. 78
The Supreme Court of Indiana has also declined to address
Taylor in the context of a defendant's right to personally testify
to an alibi despite failure to comply with the notice-of-alibi stat-
ute. 179 In Campbell v. State, a prosecution for burglary and bat-
tery, the defendant was convicted after the trial court had
precluded the defendant's own alibi testimony 80 The defense
had provided notice of an alibi defense, by the testimony of the
defendant and the defendant's sister, two days before trial.' 8'
The notice-of-alibi statute, however, required notice at least
twenty days before trial. 82 On motion by the prosecution, the
trial court precluded any alibi testimony for failure to comply
with the statute. 8 3 Although the appeal contended that the
preclusion of the defendant's own testimony violated the de-
fendant's federal constitutional rights, the Indiana Supreme
Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to argue
the defendant's claim under the state constitution. '8 Declining
to consider defendant's claims under the federal Constitution in
173. Id.
174. Id. at 652-53.
175. Id. at 653-54.
176. Id. at 655-56.
177. The basis for the decision is undisclosed. The court merely held that the
trial court had "erred." Id. at 655.
178. Id.
179. Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495, 497-98 (Ind. 1993).
180. Id. at 497.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 497-98.
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light of Taylor,8 5 the court adopted what appears to be a per se
rule that "the exclusion of a defendant's own testimony of alibi
... is an impermissible infringement upon the right of the ac-
cused to testify [under the state constitution]." 186
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in State v. Bowling 8 7
affirmed the trial court's preclusion of alibi testimony in a pros-
ecution for arson. The defense proffered the alibi two years af-
ter the prosecution had requested notice of any alibi defense
and after the state had rested at trial. 188 The defense argued
that the availability of an alibi defense was not apparent until
after a fire inspector had testified. 89 The state supreme court
disagreed, noting that the inspector's testimony was consistent
with the prosecution's prior notice as to when the crime oc-
curred.' 90 The state supreme court agreed with the trial court
that the defense "employed a last-minute switch in tactics"' 91
and that a continuance was not an appropriate remedy since
the state had already rested its case.' 92 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court quoted Taylor for the proposition that, when a
violation is "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tacti-
cal advantage" prejudicial to the prosecution, preclusion is
constitutional. 19
Neither the trial court nor the state supreme court, how-
ever, found such willful misconduct, but only a "switch in tac-
tics."1 94 On habeas corpus review, the First Circuit noted the
trial court's insufficient Taylor analysis.' 95 The First Circuit
also concluded that, although the fire inspector's testimony was
consistent with the prosecution's notice of when the crime alleg-
edly occurred, the fire department's report indicated that the
fire began slightly earlier, thereby making the alibi relevant. 96
185. Id.
186. Id. at 499 (citing IND. CONST. art. I, § 13).
187. 585 A.2d 1181 (R.I. 1991).
188. Id. at 1184.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1185.
192. Id. at 1184.
193. Id. at 1185.
194. Id.
195. Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559, 562 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993).
196. Id. at 560 & n.2. The inspector testified that the fire began thirty to
forty-five minutes before it was discovered at 11:46 p.m. Id. This testimony was
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Because of the change in the relevant time frames, and because
the defense counsel's failure to provide notice was at most negli-
gent, 197 the First Circuit held that the circumstances of the late
proffer did not suggest "willfulness" or fabricated testimony,
and thus the preclusion was unconstitutional. 198
IV. Analysis
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses ... is in plain terms
the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's
version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies .... This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law. 199
This principle became the point of departure for subsequent
courts when analyzing the constitutionality of preclusion. "At
the outset we emphasize that for a balancing test to meet Sixth
Amendment standards, it must begin with a presumption
against exclusion of otherwise admissible defense evidence." 200
This presumption called for the close scrutiny of preclusion. 20 '
The courts developed a balancing test to determine whether the
sanction of preclusion was constitutional and, when constitu-
tional error was raised, they invariably found a violation of the
constitutional right.202
Under Fendler, the most important factor to be weighed
was the significance of the precluded testimony.203 "The deter-
minative factor here is that Fendler was deprived of the testi-
consistent with the prosecution's notice to the defendant that the fire began be-
tween 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. Id. at 560. The First Circuit, however, noted that
the fire department's report stated that the fire was reported at 11:34 p.m. Id. at
560 n.2. Deciding that the fire department's report provided the most "definitive"
evidence, id., the First Circuit decided that the fire was probably set between 10:49
and 11:04 p.m., or before the noticed time. Id. at 562.
197. Id.
198. Id. The First Circuit, however, remanded to the district court for a hear-
ing to determine whether the error required reversal. Id. at 562-63. The First
Circuit indicated that the "harmless error" test in a collateral, or habeas, review
was governed by Brecht. Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
199. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
200. Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1984).
201. Braunskill, 629 F. Supp. at 522 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295).
202. See Fendler, 728 F.2d 1187; Escalera, 826 F.2d at 189-90 (analyzing the
balancing test and reviewing decisions in other circuits).
203. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188.
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mony of a witness who was important to his defense on a
material issue. That is too high a price to exact for failure to
comply with discovery orders ... "204 In Davis the court held
that when the constitutional issue was properly raised on ap-
peal, preclusion was per se unconstitutional, and the review
should be limited to an analysis of whether the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.205
On the other hand, Barron20 6 typifies the deference ac-
corded a trial judge's determination that preclusion is appropri-
ate when a constitutional question is not raised. The violation
in Barron was purely technical in nature.207 The trial judge
precluded alibi testimony because preclusion was permitted
under the rule, and because the prosecution's case was so strong
that the preclusion could not amount to an abuse of discre-
tion.208 Barron's abuse of discretion standard may also be con-
trasted with the harmless error analysis in Johnson where the
constitutional issue was raised.20 9 In Johnson, despite the
court's inclination to allow preclusion under Taylor,210 it held
that if the preclusion was constitutional error, such error could
not be harmless because a credible alibi witness must put the
prosecution's case in doubt.21' Barron, in contrast, permits the
trial judge to weigh the credibility of the proffered testimony
based upon factors only circumstantially related to the integrity
of that testimony, a technical violation of the notice-of-alibi rule
and the strength of the prosecution's case.
Taylor revolutionized Compulsory Process Clause analysis.
The Court held that the preclusion sanction does not necessar-
204. Id. at 1190.
205. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1978).
207. The response to the discovery order was one day late, and there was no
showing of bad faith. Id. at 755-56.
208. Id. at 758. Had the constitutional issue been raised, the analysis, though
not the outcome, would necessarily change. If the court found constitutional error,
it could nonetheless hold the error harmless. Because a jury may find alibi testi-
mony credible, a judge's threshold determination of credibility in harmless error
analysis intrudes upon the defendant's right to a jury trial. See supra notes 160-61
and accompanying text.
209. Johnson, 970 F.2d at 912.
210. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
1994] 619
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
ily run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.212 This part of the deci-
sion overruled the per se unconstitutionality of preclusion held
in Davis.213 The Court stated: "[i]t would demean the high pur-
pose of the Compulsory Process Clause to construe it as encom-
passing an absolute right to an automatic continuance or
mistrial to allow presumptively perjured testimony to be
presented to a jury."214 Since the proffer of perjured testimony
has no constitutional protection anyway, 215 the significance of
Taylor is that a trial judge may now make the "presumption"
that the testimony is perjured on the basis of "a pattern of dis-
covery violations."21 6 The Court found that the facts in Taylor
provided a sufficient pattern to justify such an inference.
Taylor's counsel moved twice to amend his list of witnesses
in violation of the discovery rules.21 7 The first motion was made
and granted on the first day of trial, although the witnesses
never testified.218 The second motion was made on the second
day of trial, and counsel explained the lateness of his request by
saying that he had just learned of two new eyewitnesses. 21 9
Only one witness, Wormley, appeared to make an offer of proof
the next day.220 Wormley contradicted the defense counsel by
testifying that he had not witnessed the actual fight and that he
had spoken to defense counsel a week before trial. 22'
Therefore, the "pattern" in Taylor consisted of two motions,
the first without effect, and the second accompanied by deceit.
Assuming counsel's deceit, Wormley's testimony, impeaching
the defense counsel, was irrationally accepted as truthful only
in that regard.222 If counsel were attempting to "fabricate testi-
212. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 402.
213. Davis, 639 F.2d at 243.
214. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416.
215. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the defendant had no
constitutional right to present perjured testimony).
216. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414.
217. Id. at 403.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 404.
221. Id. at 405.
222. The assumption that Wormley's testimony was truthful when it discred-
ited the defense attorney, but false when it helped the defendant, is remininscent
of the flawed logic in the Texas statute found unconstitutional in Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. at 22. See supra note 42.
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mony,"223 he was off to a poor start. In any event, the relation-
ship between counsel's unethical method of attempting to
introduce a witness and the veracity of that witness is attenu-
ated. Counsel's methods are deserving of sanction,224 but fail-
ure to sanction the culprit counsel, and instead sanctioning the
defendant, hardly preserves faith in "the integrity of the judicial
process" 225 from the perspective of the defendant.
The "pattern" also consisted of the events leading up to the
motion to introduce Wormley's testimony. The Court found
that since counsel was aware of Wormley prior to making the
granted motion to add two eye-witnesses, "the inference that he
was deliberately seeking a tactical advantage is inescapable."226
The Court found it irrelevant whether such an advantage was
achieved in fact.227 "Regardless of whether prejudice to the
prosecution could have been avoided in this particular case, it is
plain that this case fits into the category of willful misconduct
in which the severest sanction is appropriate."228 The Court
held that if the failure to comply with a discovery request "was
willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage
... it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Com-
pulsory Process Clause simply to exclude the witness'
testimony."229
The Court's reasoning here subordinates truth-seeking to
courtroom discipline. There was nothing about the proffered
testimony which made it so intrinsically suspicious that a jury
might not find it credible. 230 However, the Court also justified
the preclusion sanction on the grounds that the misconduct
"gives rise to a sufficiently strong inference that 'witnesses are
223. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413.
224. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer
shall not knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribu-
nal."). The Court acknowledges that disciplinary action could be taken against the
defense counsel, but notes that any sanction short of preclusion would not elimi-
nate the risk of perjured testimony. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413.
225. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416.
226. Id. at 417.
227. Id. at 416.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 415.
230. Wormley's testimony would have corroborated the eyewitness testimony
of the only other two witnesses for the defense. Id. at 402-03.
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being found that really weren't there,' . .. "231 This inference
that the proffered testimony is perjured, makes other sanctions
inadequate since other sanctions would not preclude the
testimony.232
The Taylor Court took pains not to develop a pat formula
for preclusion.233 Although the Court held that the specific facts
of the case justified preclusion,234 the Court's emphasis on im-
proper trial tactics on one hand, and the probability of at-
tempted perjury on the other, leaves the scope of the decision
uncertain. Although, the Court certainly holds that preclusion
is constitutional when both improper tactics and grounds for
suspecting perjury are found,235 the Court presents each factor
independently as though each factor alone was sufficient
grounds for preclusion. The independence of these factors is ex-
pressed in subsequent decisions.
The argument for characterizing Taylor as permitting pre-
clusion without the inference of perjury is supported by the
Court's subsequent decision, Lucas v. Michigan.236 In Lucas,
the Court cited Taylor as permitting preclusion for "'willful
misconduct'... designed to obtain 'a tactical advantage.' ",237 By
not referring to those portions of Taylor which seem to require
an inference of perjury, Lucas suggests that such an inference is
either automatic or unnecessary. Other cases, purportedly fol-
lowing Taylor, also rely on the defense's bad faith to justify pre-
clusion without making an inference that the proffered
testimony is perjured. 238
The Second Circuit in Escalera239 decided that failure to
comply with the discovery rule had to result from willful con-
duct "motivated by a desire to gain tactical advantage" to war-
rant preclusion under Taylor.240 The Second Circuit's review of
231. Id. at 417.
232. Id. at 414.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 402.
235. Id. at 414.
236. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
237. Id. at 152 (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417).
238. E.g., Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988); State v. Passino,
640 A.2d 547 (Vt. 1994); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 571 A.2d 1062 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990).
239. Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 48.
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Taylor focused on the deception and lateness by the defense at-
torney as evidence of the effort to gain a tactical advantage241
and, therefore, evidently found an inference of perjury unneces-
sary for constitutional preclusion. The court remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the bad faith factor and did not instruct
the district court to weigh the credibility or probative value of
the proffered testimony in light of the bad faith.242 Evidently
the court interpreted bad faith to be the dispositive factor.243
The court in Zimmerman, citing Escalera, upheld the trial
court's preclusion of an alibi defense since it found the discovery
violation was a deliberate attempt to delay the trial.244 Again,
the Zimmerman court found it unnecessary to justify preclusion
on the basis that the delay tactics made it likely that the prof-
fered testimony was perjured.245
The court in Chappee also found that willful misconduct
was the dispositive factor.246 The expert testimony proffered in
Chappee was unlikely to be perjured, and in its analysis the
court did not even allude to its probative value.247 Unlike the
cool reception given to Taylor in Escalera, however, the Chap-
pee court embraced Taylor as a salutary defense of trial court
discretion. 248 The Chappee court determined that the egregious
trial tactics employed by the defense justified preclusion under
Taylor.249 The First Circuit did not consider the distinction
"critical" between the testimony in Taylor, which was treated as
probably perjured, and the testimony in Chappee, which was al-
most certainly truthful. 250 The First Circuit found the use of
241. Id. at 47-48.
242. Id. at 48-49.
243. In Cervone, 907 F.2d at 346, the Second Circuit appeared to find the mar-
ginal value of the testimony determinative. See infra note 254 and accompanying
text.
244. Zimmerman, 571 A.2d at 1068.
245. Id. at 1066-68.
246. Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 1988).
247. In the court's analysis of the ineffective counsel claim, it found the pre-
cluded isomer theory testimony a "slender straw" on which to base a defense.
Chappee, 843 F.2d at 34. See also supra note 137.
248. Chappee, 843 F.2d at 32.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 31. The Chappee court did, however, disparage the probity of the
proffered testimony when analyzing the separate claim for ineffective counsel. Id.
at 33. If the court had employed Fendler balancing in its preclusion analysis, and
weighed improper trial tactics heavily pursuant to Taylor, the court would have
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surprise tactics equally inimical to the truth-finding process as
perjury.251 By finding preclusion constitutional, the First Cir-
cuit held that preclusion was not an abuse of discretion.252
On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit in
Johnson construed Taylor as not requiring bad faith to constitu-
tionally preclude exculpatory testimony.253 "We think any re-
quirement of bad faith as an absolute condition to exclusion
would be inconsistent with the Taylor Court's reference to trial
court discretion and its extended discussion of the relevant fac-
tors."254 The court's interpretation of Taylor is expansive.
Though it is true that Taylor did not attempt to "draft a compre-
hensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in
every possible case,"255 Taylor's discussion of the factors, other
than bad faith, relevant to preclusion of otherwise material and
probative evidence, was limited to a sentence and a footnote cit-
ing the Fendler balancing test.256
Taylor held that where willful misconduct implicated the
truthfulness of the proffered testimony, the testimony may be
constitutionally precluded. 257 The Johnson court, however, is
been able to constitutionally preclude the testimony without adopting an expan-
sive reading of Taylor.
251. Id. at 31.
252. Id. at 34.
253. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
254. Id. The court cited Cervone for the proposition that the Second Circuit
did not consider the "willful misconduct" factor as essential to preclude testimony,
as might be inferred from Escalera. Id. In Cervone, the Second Circuit cited the
six month delay in providing the required notice of expert testimony as demon-
strating the defendant's apparent lack of true interest in the evidence. Cervone,
907 F.2d at 346. The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's preclusion by
merely noting that the proffered testimony was of marginal relevance and that
preclusion was constitutional under Taylor. Id. See also supra note 145 and ac-
companying text. The court's cursory treatment does not reach the issue of "willful
misconduct," and should be considered of little precedential value. Cervone, 907
F.2d at 345-46. It may be inferred that the court applied a short-hand balancing
test and found that the defendant's marginal interest in the proffered testimony
was outweighed by the defense's bad faith. That the court found bad faith may be
inferred from its characterization of the delay as unexcused and unexplained. Id.
at 346. The emphasis on the marginal relevance of the testimony suggests that the
court found error, if any, to be harmless.
255. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414.
256. Id. at 414-15 & n.19. The Court also discussed the preclusion sanction
approved in Nobles. The court in Nobles, however, conditioned admissibilty of the
testimony rather than barring it. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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correct that Taylor never asserted that preclusion could only be
constitutional where such conduct was manifest.258 Nonethe-
less, the Johnson court held that preclusion would have been
justified if the trial court had not made the contrary finding that
the attorney's conduct was in good faith259 because alternate
sanctions would not lessen prejudice. 260
This emphasis on prejudice, standing alone, has no textual
support from Taylor. The Taylor Court asserted that alternate
sanctions were inadequate because of the willful misconduct re-
gardless of the prejudice to the prosecution. 26 1 Johnson, how-
ever, does not rest solely on the importance of prejudice. The
court also noted the unexcused delay in the proffer of the testi-
mony.26 2 Finally, the District of Columbia Circuit suggested
that Taylor balancing tests the credibility of the proffered testi-
mony.263 The Johnson court, therefore, while disclaiming bad
faith as a necessary factor, suggested that an inference of per-
jury may somehow be automatically obtained where Taylor bal-
ancing otherwise permits preclusion.
Whether an inference of perjury is unnecessary, or auto-
matic, Taylor balances with the single weight of the conduct of
the defense attorney. Under either interpretation of Taylor, a
court no longer needs to analyze the circumstances of the de-
fense's misconduct to infer that the proffered testimony is per-
jured. In addition, the last vestige of Fendler's paramount
concern, the importance of the testimony to the defendant, is
eliminated. Failure to consider the probative value of the testi-
mony is antithetical to the truth-seeking justification for discov-
ery. This failure has also reduced appellate scrutiny of the
preclusion sanction. In Fendler balancing, the presumption
was that preclusion was unconstitutional. 2 The abandonment
of this presumption after Taylor is underscored by the rarity
258. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
259. Johnson, 970 F.2d at 911-12.
260. Id. at 912. Cf People v. Gonzales, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 333 (Ct. App.
1994) (holding that preclusion is only permissible where there is significant preju-
dice and willful misconduct).
261. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417.
262. Johnson, 970 F.2d at 912.
263. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
264. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188.
1994] 625
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
with which courts even consider the materiality of the proffered
testimony.265
Aside from these decisions that arguably expand Taylor's
holding, 266 several premises of Taylor itself are flawed. The
Court set forth a rule that, where a defense attorney willfully,
and to gain a tactical advantage, fails to comply with a discov-
ery rule, preclusion is an appropriate sanction. 267 It justified
the rule by asserting that testimony proffered under such cir-
cumstances would probably be peijured.268 To the extent that a
trial court may exclude improperly proffered testimony on the
grounds that it is presumed tainted, the Court has taken a long
step towards the reintroduction of the type of a priori exclusory
rules held unconstitutional by the Court in Washington v.
Texas.269 To the extent that material evidence may be excluded
solely as a sanction for "bad faith" violation of the rules, it has
made adherence to the rules a super-ordinate goal, tran-
scending their purpose, truth-seeking.270
The Court further held that it is appropriate to "visit the
sins of the lawyer upon his client."27'1 The justification offered
for this proposition is that to do otherwise would "strike[ ] at the
heart of the attorney-client relationship."27 2 The Court's obei-
sance to the attorney-client relationship is expressed in the
proposition that a relevant factor allowing preclusion is the de-
fense attorney's misconduct in unrelated trials.27 3 The context
of this extraordinary proposition is the Court's faith that a trial
judge can divine, from a pattern of past misconduct, when a de-
265. See supra part III.D.
266. In Bowling v. Vose, the court did consider the relation between "willful
misconduct" and the trustworthiness of the proffered testimony when holding that
preclusion was unconstitutional in the case before it. 3 F.3d 559, 561-62 (1st Cir.
1993).
267. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
268. Contra Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1186 (quoting United States v. Davis, 639
F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981)) ("[d]iscovery rules... have no effect on the probative
value of otherwise admissible evidence. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, 'discovery
orders are designed to prevent surprise, not to protect the integrity of the evidence
sought to be presented.' ").
269. 388 U.S. 14. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
270. See supra part II. Neither the trial court in Taylor, nor any reviewing
court, ever considered the importance of the proffered testimony to the defendant.
271. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416.
272. Id. at 417.
273. Id. at 416 n.22.
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fense attorney is seeking to introduce perjured testimony. If
there is any justification for this argument, it is greater in civil
litigation, where market forces check attorney conduct, and the
penalty for egregious misconduct is merely monetary.274 But, in
the criminal process, the defendant's rights and remedies are
very different.
The majority of criminal defendants are indigent and repre-
sented by court appointed attorneys or public defenders over
whom the defendant has little control.27 5 Outcome-determina-
tive attorney error in civil litigation is grounds for an action in
malpractice.27 6 The incarcerated and indigent criminal defend-
ant is unlikely to have the means for malpractice litigation and
cannot thereby recover his liberty in any case.27 7 Furthermore,
since Taylor has held that it is constitutional to punish a de-
fendant for the attorney's misconduct, the preclusion sanction
cannot provide grounds for a claim of constitutionally deficient
counsel.278 The preclusion sanction in Taylor is premised, in
part, on the necessity of maintaining the attorney-client rela-
tionship.27 9 The premise underlying a claim for ineffective
counsel is that an attorney has so breached his duty that the
client should not be bound by the consequences of the attorney's
acts or omissions.280 To hold that a defendant should be liable
274. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pic-
tures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's damages claim dismissed af-
ter four years of failing to comply with discovery).
275. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
276. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980)
(holding attorney liable for malpractice based on his failing to adequately research
his client's claim and failing to inform his client of the statute of limitations).
277. A court-appointed attorney may, however, be liable to the criminal de-
fendant for malpractice. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
278. "[Tlhe accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The federal right is applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to counsel implies that counsel must
provide some minimum assistance in order to give the provision meaningful effect.
For an exposition of this standard, see infra note 280.
279. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
280. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland sets forth
a two prong test for constitutionally ineffective counsel. The first prong is whether
the counsel acted unreasonably given broad professional standards. Id. at 687.
The second prong requires the unreasonable conduct to unduly prejudice the de-
fendant. Id. Taylor limited Strickland by holding that if the attorney's unreasona-
ble conduct is intentional, the defendant should be prejudiced by precluding the
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for his attorney's acts for the purpose of sanctions cannot logi-
cally be reconciled with the argument that the same defendant
should not be held liable for the same acts in an argument for
ineffective counsel. 28'
It is true that it may be impossible to determine whether
the defendant or the attorney is guilty of misconduct. Nonethe-
less, the holding in Taylor, that the defendant's complicity is
irrelevant, runs counter to the movement in civil procedure to
hold attorneys to a standard of reasonable conduct, 282 and to re-
cent parallel developments in criminal procedure. 28 3 At best, it
is inequitable to impose the preclusion sanction, which falls
squarely on the defendant, for the attorney's independent viola-
tion of the rules, and not to punish the attorney as well. 284
The Supreme Court also found the deterrence interest in
imposing the preclusion sanction of only marginal relevance, 288
although deterrence was a major consideration of the trial judge
imposing the sanction.286 Preclusion is, at least in part, a pun-
ishment. Barring the inference that the main purpose of impos-
ing the sanction 'is to gain retribution, the sanction must be
predicated upon the theories that the proffered evidence is per-
jured or for the sake of trial efficiency. If the purpose were mere
retribution, then imposition of the penalty without a finding of
the defendant's fault would raise substantial due process ques-
tions unaddressed by the Supreme Court. Simple trial effi-
ciency, without concern for the probative value of the evidence
proffered testimony. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417-18. The Second Circuit in Escalera
may have been considering Strickland when, in dicta, the court argued that Taylor
did not require sanctioning the defendant for the defense counsel's negligence or
inadvertence. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
281. See Chappee, 843 F.2d at 33-34 (holding that where the defendant is lia-
ble for attorney tactics, permitting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
would unfairly provide defendant with benefit of tactics or, failing success of same,
with claim for ineffective counsel).
282. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(f), 37(g); N.Y. CT. R. 310.
283. See, e.g., Young v. Nevada, 818 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1991) (imposing sanctions
on criminal defense attorney for filing frivolous motion). Whether sanctions
should have been imposed in Young is questionable, but irrelevant to the present
discussion.
284. In Taylor, it is impossible to blame the defendant for the defense attor-
ney's lying to the court about when the defense attorney had talked to Wormley.
285. Treatment of the deterrence interest is limited to one footnote. Taylor,
484 U.S. at 416 n.22.
286. See generally supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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or the fault of the defendant, also raises due process concerns.
It may be inferred that it is because of these concerns that the
Taylor Court relied heavily on the presumption that the prof-
fered testimony was perjured in order to justify the sanction.287
Thereafter, apparently comfortable with the constitutionality of
preclusion, the Supreme Court in Lucas288 and other courts fol-
lowing Taylor,289 have dropped the presumption upon which
Taylor relied.
It has been suggested that the trial court could permit the
suspicious testimony and impose an alternate sanction of al-
lowing the prosecution, or the judge, to inform the jury of the
circumstances under which the testimony is being permitted.290
Such an instruction could be required as a condition to allowing
the testimony and thus has some doctrinal support under
Nobles.291 The advantage of this alternate sanction is that it
preserves the jury's fact-finding role while permitting the court
to insure that the jury is fully informed. On the other hand,
when the defense counsel is merely attempting to disrupt the
proceedings to gain a tactical advantage, such an instruction
would introduce extrinsic facts relevant to the character of the
attorney, but having no bearing on the credibility of the prof-
fered testimony. The instruction, therefore, is essentially evi-
dence of the bad character of the defense counsel being used to
impeach a witness and should, on the basis of relevance or un-
fair prejudice, be inadmissible.292
Two state supreme courts have not followed Taylor. The
Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Ben 293 ignored the central
holding of Taylor and made only passing reference to that deci-
sion in regards to the liability the defendant could have for his
attorney's actions. 294 The court in Ben had the requisite predi-
cate to sustain the preclusion under Taylor. The trial court had
found two discovery violations which it attributed to an intent
287. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 239-65 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, The Search For Truth In Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1446 (1991).
291. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
292. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
293. 798 P.2d 650 (Or. 1990).
294. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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by the defense to circumvent the truth.295 It may be inferred
that the court in Ben ascribed greater weight to the probative
value of the testimony than to the one sided balancing test uti-
lized in Taylor.
The Supreme Court of Indiana also declined to apply Com-
pulsory Process Clause analysis under Taylor to a defendant
precluded by the trial court from testifying to an alibi on his
own behalf.296 The court ordered the litigants before it to brief
their arguments under the state constitution which, the court
decided, prohibited the preclusion of the defendant's own testi-
mony.297 The decision evinced a distrust of the United States
Supreme Court's willingness to defend what the Indiana
Supreme Court deemed a fundamental right.298
V. Conclusion
Taylor's holding that the preclusion sanction is appropriate
to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to exclude
suspect testimony fails to give sufficient weight to truth-seeking
values. Taylor permits the trial court to preclude testimony
when it is proffered in violation of discovery rules on a presump-
tion that the testimony is peijured. Since the preclusion is con-
stitutional, abuse of discretion is the appellate standard of
review. Equipped with this broad discretion, the trial court
may withhold from the jury probative, and possibly crucial ex-
culpatory evidence. The trial court is further empowered to im-
pose this drastic sanction upon the defendant for misconduct
295. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
296. Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495, 497-99 (Ind. 1993).
297. Id.
298. The United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145
(1991), struck down what it construed as a per se rule that a defendant in a prose-
cution for rape may always testify under the Sixth Amendment concerning prior
consensual sexual relations with the victim despite violation of Michigan's rape
shield statute. The Court held: "The Sixth Amendment is not so rigid. The [stat-
ute] serves legitimate state interests .... Failure to comply with this requirement
may in some cases justify even the severe sanction of preclusion." Id. at 152. Be-
cause Campbell suggests a per se rule prohibiting the preclusion of a defendant's
own alibi testimony, it is probable the Indiana Supreme Court was seeking to insu-
late its decision from United States Supreme Court review by explicitly relying on
the state constitution as the basis for its decision. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983) (holding that the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
hear an appeal from a state court where the state decision considered federal law
and did not have a clearly independent basis in state law).
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wholly attributable to the defense attorney. Moreover, the de-
fense attorney's misconduct in Taylor, which set forth this rule,
could as easily be explained by poor judgment, incompetence,
and overwork as by the ascribed evil intent.
Taylor frees the hand of the trial judge to make independ-
ent determinations regarding motives behind misconduct, and
consequently, the veracity of exculpatory testimony. This defer-
ence, applauded in Johnson, is antithetical to the constitutional
interest in compulsory process which is to put all probative evi-
dence before the jury. Furthermore, courts following Taylor
have amplified the holding and discarded Taylor's tenuous link
between the misconduct and the veracity of the proffered testi-
mony. The bad faith of the defense, or prejudice to the prosecu-
tion coupled with an insufficient explanation for the discovery
violation, have become sufficient and independent grounds to
preclude otherwise relevant testimony.
Undoubtedly, there is a strong institutional interest in trial
discipline and efficiency. There may well be a legitimate, "real
world" need to add weight in the balance to willful misconduct,
a factor considered barely relevant in Fendler, but of legitimate
concern in Cervone and Chappee. But Taylor and its progeny,
by creating a test which ignores the defendant's culpability and
interest in the testimony, has fashioned a sword to enforce dis-
covery that strikes at the heart of discovery's purpose, to fur-
ther truth-seeking.
Matthew R. Atkinson
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